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REBUTTAL
Summary
In

Sean Mocabee’s (“Sean”) opening

brief,

impermissibly used the partition statutes to quiet

he asserted that the

title

district court 1)

against Sean, 2) errantly allowed Lindsey

evidence which contradicted the plain and unambiguous deed,

Wilson (“Lindsey”)

t0 present

and 3) erred when

disregarded the fact that Lindsey intentionally and knowingly placed Sean

it

on the deed.
In response, Lindsey argued that 1)

statutes

because

i)

Sean invited the

property, 2) the district court

ambiguous

was

error,

and

was proper
ii)

t0 try the matter

under the partition

Sean presumptively held an

interest in the

correct in allowing parole evidence because the deed

and

as to percentage interests,

substantial evidence.

it

Each argument

3) that the district court’s

ﬁndings were supported by

Will be addressed as follows:

Contrary t0 Lindsey’s assertion, Sean did not invite the

error,

but properly obj ected, even

ﬁling a motion in limine. Moreover, the partition statutes cannot be used to quiet
a party “presumptively” holds

title

title

even When

as the language 0f the partition statute is clear: partition

requires a cotenancy. Besides, allowing a court t0 use the partition statutes t0 quiet

the statute of limitations for quiet

was

title

actions and wreaks havoc

on the

legal

title

subverts

burden of proof that

each party must bear.
Additionally, the district court erred

intent t0 not give

Sean an

the determination of how

Appellant’s Reply Brief— Pg.

1

interest,

by allowing

in parol evidence

ofLindsey ’s alleged

because that contradicts the plain language 0f the deed. Only

much interest Sean owned

should have been on

trial,

Which evidence

was presented

in

fact the Lindsey,

abundance by Sean. Lastly, the

knowing

that

district court either erred

by placing Sean on

home, placed Sean on the deed anyway, 0r was

the deed he

when

would own a

clearly erroneous

by ﬁnding

1/2

it

ignored the

interest in the

that

Lindsey did not

intend t0 give Sean an interest in the property.

Arguments
1.

Sean only Agreed

t0 the Court’s

Errant Proceeding After Properly Objecting

Lindsey’s arguments regarding Sean’s alleged invited error are raised for the ﬁrst time in
Lindsey’s Response Brief, and as such were not discussed in Sean’s Opening Brief. Therefore, a
short recitation 0f the relevant facts as they apply to this topic

is

appropriate and helpful for the

discussion regarding Lindsey’s claim that Sean invited error in the district court.

FACTS
o

April

2,

2018: Hearing regarding Sean’s Second Motion for

Summary Judgment. Sean

argues that a statute of limitations applies t0 the equitable lienl that exists

spends

money on improvements

since Lindsey’s quiet

title

claiming an equitable

lien,

statutes left to

owned property. Sean’s counsel

a party

points out that

was dismissed by summary judgment and Lindsey was not

then a

trial

was moot because

the only item under the partition

be performed was the selling of the home.

MR. FRANTZ
clariﬁcation,

1

action

t0 jointly

when

I

(Sean’s counsel): If I can ask a couple of points of
guess, at this point,

What would we be going

Throughout most 0f the argument, Sean’s counsel

refers t0 a claim for

to trial

on?

If

an “equitable lien” as a

claim for contribution 0r a contribution claim, Which terminology mirrors the language used in

most jurisdictions’ case law.

Appellant’s Reply Brief— Pg. 2

we’re both joint owners,
it’s

just selling

partition statutes because

0

not claim for contribution at that point,

and distributing?

Counsel for Sean argued that there was nothing t0 g0 to

Tr. 4723-7.

there

if there’s

were no claims

November

it

was already determined

for contribution

(i.e.

Sean ﬁled a Motion

19, 2018:

that

trial

Sean was a joint owner, and that

equitable lien rights) asserted.

in

Limine Which sought

to preclude the

of evidence Which showed that Lindsey did not intend t0 give Sean any

Sean argued that
261.

Under

it

on under the

had “already been determined

that

interest.

is

R. 260-62.

interest. .”

Lindsey gave Sean an

the partition statutes, “the only question that remains

admission

.

how much

R.

0f an interest

did she give him.” Id.

o

November

26, 2019: Prior t0 the

prohibit Lindsey

from Claiming

trial,

that

Sean argued a Motion in Limine

0%

Sean has

that sought t0

interest in the property.

At

that hearing,

Sean’s counsel stated,

MR. FRANTZ: What I’m

saying

is

inappropriate

is

arguing whether 0r

It’s already been
[Sean Mocabee] owns anything
my
determined that Mr. Mocabee is 0n the deed and has an interest. What we
can bring extrinsic evidence in t0 show is how much is that percentage and

not

client

what’s that
Tr. 79: 8-16.

o

November

At

.

.

.

interest.

the beginning of trial, Sean’s

26, 2019: Prior t0

trial,

Motion

in

Limine was denied.

but after the arguments and decision regarding the Motion

in Limine, the parties orally discussed with the district court their

would proceed 0n
this

was

the issue of gift and whether 0r not there

after Sean’s

Motion

Appellant’s Reply Brief— Pg. 3

in

Tr. 81: 14-15.

Limine was denied

in toto).

agreement that the

was an

trial

intent t0 gift (0f course,

Tr. 89:3 -94:1.

It

may

noteworthy

that,

contrary t0 Lindsey’s assertion, Sean did not stipulate t0 apply the law from

the State of Washington.

framework

stipulated to

Nor

did the district court adopt Washington Law. Instead, the

was more akin

to the

law from Alaska, Oregon, and Wyoming.

ARGUMENT
With

that factual

backdrop in place, While Lindsey argues that Sean invited the error

because he consented to the manner in which the
after

Sean argued

statutes.

that the trial court could not

trial

proceeded, that consent was only given

ﬁnd Sean owns

In fact, Sean’s arguments in that regard

a

0%

interest

were denied twice: ﬁrst

under the partition

at a

summary judgment

hearing and then at the motion in limine.
“.
.

.if

objection...”

a motion in limine has been

Davidson

clear in both his

v.

made and

denied, defense counsel need not repeat the

Beco Corp, 733 P.2d 781

fn. 3 (Id. Ct.

summary judgment motion and his motion

App. 1986). Sean made

it

in limine that the district court could

not use the partition statutes t0 deny Sean any interest in the home. Only after those motions

were rejected by the

As

court, did

Sean agree that the issue of gift would be the focus of trial.

such, Sean did not invite the error.

He provided the

district court

With two

opportunities t0 recognize that the issue 0f Whether or not Sean held any interest at

house was not one Which could be resolved

at trial

decided. In short, Sean twice argued that the

because the quiet

of the

trial

had

t0 include that

Appellant’s Reply Brief— Pg. 4

Sean had some

interest.

--

period.

the

action had already been

summary judgment denying Lindsey’s

claim resulted in a judgment whereby Sean was 0n the deed
result

title

all in

Sean argued

quiet

title

that the

As

such, any assertion that Sean invited the error

proceed as stipulated once the

district court

be found lacking any ownership

Lindsey next argues that

deny Sean 0f any ownership

it

was possible

interest in the

0n

title is

“[W]here a
be given

v.

statute is clear

is

sets forth the

set forth

cotenants hold

Reply Brief at

.

.

.

by

V.

However, the

p. 5.

Dist.

Supreme Court reviews de novo.

N0. 25, 451 P.3d 25, 29 (Idaho 2019).

minimum requirements 0f

may

“WHEN

[A]

real property as parceners, joint tenants 0r tenants in

time of partition.

he should have had an

not alter party’s interests.

Appellant’s Reply Brief— Pg. 5

..

it

I.C.

interest

PARTITION MAY BE

only partition property “when several

at the start

0f the

common.

.”

it

“determines” them.

A court

can only determine

§6-508. Since Sean had an interest

When the

LC. §6-501.

.

litigation is notable.

does not have the authority to eliminate the interest Sean had. Instead,
litigation started,

When

Kootenai County, 576 P.2d 206 (1978). Moreover,

the legislature that a court

interests exist at the

this

and unambiguous the expressed intent 0f the legislature must

Lindsey’s admission that Sean had an interest

What

when

void 0f an interest in property for which

a question 0f law which the

Pocatello/Chubbuck Sch.

It is

may be found to be

Worley Highway Dist.

effect.”

LC. §6-501

HAD.”

after trial.”

did have an interest

title statutes.

the interpretation of a statute

Zeyen

home because “Sean

not supported by the plain language 0f the partition statutes, especially

juxtaposed against the quiet

2

Sean could not

for the district court t0 use the partition statutes

was eliminated

position that a cotenant in a partition

is

clearly denied his assertion that

to

interest in the property.

litigation startedz, [but] his interest

he

Sean only agreed

Holding a Presumptive Interest Does Not Meet the Minimum Requirements for a
Partition Action-- a Partition Action cannot be used t0 Quiet Title

2.

t0

had

ﬁctitious because

is

litigation ended, too.

When the

A partition does

A partition action is designed to d0 just that: partition property held by multiple people.

At

risk

0f overstating the obvious, in order t0 partition property, there must be multiple owners;
otherwise, there

is

no cause

to partition the property.

The

partition statutes at

n0 point

in time

discuss “putative” or “presumptive” owners. Instead, they clearly indicate that partition

may be

had when there are multiple owners of the same piece 0f property.
Conversely, the language in the quiet

brought by any person against another
adverse t0 him.
situations

.”
.

interest is

owns

when that

“’It is

forth that,

parties disputing

title statute is

who owns

may be

action

.

.

.

clear that

real property (and

property

it

applies to

whether or not

ﬂy interest). A quiet title action is t0 determine Who the owner of an

interest is disputed.

a universally recognized rule 0f construction that, where a constitution 0r statute

speciﬁes certain things, the designation 0f such things excludes

known

“An

claims an estate 0r interest in real

LC. 6-401. The language of the quiet

Where there are multiple

the other person

Who

title statutes set

as expression unius est exclusion alterius.”

236 P.3d 1284, 1288 (Idaho 2010). The

all others,’

KGF Development, LLC

partition statute has

been

maxim commonly

a

v.

set forth t0

City ofKetchum,

apply

when

“several cotenants hold and are in possession of real property as parceners, joint tenants or

common.

tenants in

.”
.

LC. §6-501. The partition

presumptive cotenants hold.

people claim an interest in

.”
.

The

statute

does not mention

when

partition statute does not claim t0 apply

real property. .” Instead,
.

it

“several

when

speciﬁcally points out that

“several

it

speciﬁc time: “when several cotenants hold and are in possession 0f real property...”
specifying

when the

partition statutes applied

Appellant’s Reply Brief— Pg. 6

(when there

applies at a

By

are multiple owners), the legislature

intended t0 exclude

all

other scenarios, including the scenario Where two people assert

competing claims of interest in
also

It is

Lindsey was

interest,

the sole

worth noting that the

district court

is left

at all

property

is

--

t0 a quiet title action).

determined that Lindsey did not give Sean an
at

any time. As such, since Sean never had

times the sole owner 0f the property. If Lindsey was, at

owner of the property a partition action cannot

cotenants.” Since

as the court determined

--

lie

how

As can be

is circular.

It

used a

district court

..

is

the sole

who was

seen from the above, the conclusion reached by the

statute that requires there

that there are not multiple cotenants.

times

Lindsey was the sole owner, “partition 0f the

can the partition statute be used t0 render judgment against Sean.

apparently not a cotenant?

all

because there were not “several

unnecessary.” R. 361. If there was nothing t0 partition because Lindsey

owner, then

court

(Which

That means that Sean never had any interest

interest.

any

real property

district

be multiple cotenants t0 render a judgment

Such was reversible

Therefore the judgment 0f the

error.

should be reversed.

A court in a partition action is not supposed to determine whether or not a party has an
interest.

Instead, in

party owns.

its

attempt to partition property, a court

To determine what

interest

presumptions and inferences. Each tool

owned. .. not ifan

interest is

some degree 0f ownership)

is

designed to help a court determine what interest

district court

to determine that

Q

is

used the partition tools (Which assume

interest

was owned.

In the case at hand, Lindsey always (even through

Appellant’s Reply Brief— Pg. 7

determine what interest each

each party owns, the courts have employed a series 0f

owned. The

interest in the property. Lindsey’s

may

trial)

disputed that Sean had any

claim was always that Sean had n0 interest (despite the fact

that she

an

knowingly placed him 0n

interest in real property

title).

That claim sounds in a quiet

and Sean was claiming an

title

action because there

is

interest in the real property adverse to

Lindsey.

3.

Allowing a Court t0 use the Partition Statutes t0 Quiet Title Subverts the Statute 0f
Limitations, the Statute 0f Repose
This distinction between a partition action and a quiet

used over the other

is

ever s0 important because a quiet

title

title

action and

When one should be

claim has a distinct accrual (for the

purposes of statute 0f limitations enforcement), While a partition action never really accrues for
the purposes 0f the statute of limitations (because the parties continue being co-owners). See Tr.

35: 11 -36:8. So, if the partition action

is

able t0 d0 the exact

same thing

as a quiet

title

the partition action will gut the necessity and practicality of the statute 0f limitations as

t0 quiet title actions.

On October
her

For example,

17,

2013, Lindsey directed the

was recorded

it

applies

in the case at hand:

name and Sean Mocabee’s name. Aug.

the property

action,

as she directed.

title

company

to vest title

of the property in

EX. R. 10 (Trial EX. F). That same day, the

Aug. EX. R. 15

years Lindsey Wilson did nothing about Sean’s

Lindsey did not challenge Sean’s ownership

(Trial EX. G).

name being on

title.

interest in the house.

title

to

For more than four

For more than four years

For more than four years,

Sean and Lindsey lived as though Sean and Lindsey owned the home jointly and they shared one
another’s

bills.

Appellant’s Reply Brief— Pg. 8

The

statute

of limitations for a quiet

title

action

is

four years and

it

begins t0 accrue

when

another person claims an adverse interest in real property. I.C. §5-224; LC. §6-401; see also

Brown

v.

Greenheart, 157 Idaho 156, 162 (2014).

Then, 0n October 20, 2017, more than four years
limitations

title

had run) Lindsey decides she wants Sean’s

and, in the alternative, t0 partition.

later

(and after the four-year statute 0f

interest back.

When her quiet title

claim

the basis 0f the statute of limitations, she then achieves the exact

And the

partition action.

result

partition claim t0 achieve the

of limitations, which
It is

concludes that

when

“.

does not disclose

..

that

and

the

0f a quiet
is

.

[Sean’s] interest

Sean had an

appropriately

same judgment through the

title

action, the

whole purpose 0f the

Response Brief p.

that,

5.

“Sean did have an

statute

after trial.” Interestingly

district court

interest in the property

was

When

rights the various parties have.

interest

However, Lindsey then
enough, Lindsey

able t0 “eliminate” Sean’s

the property started, the court cannot

power t0 determine

in a partition action. Instead, the court only has the

LC. §6-508. The partition

allow a court t0 “eliminate” an interest that a party had immediately prior to

Appellant’s Reply Brief— Pg. 9

0n

eviscerated.

was eliminated

court can only determine What rights existed.

rej ected

same had 50 years passed. By allowing a

Lindsey concedes in her argument

the litigation started. .”

away from him

interests

result

how 0r by what manner the

interest at trial. If

what

same

a statute 0f “repose,”

worth noting

in this property

take that

is

would have been

is

So, she ﬁles suit t0 quiet

statutes

trial.

d0 not

Instead, the

In conclusion,

it

was

error for the district court t0

employ

the partition statutes t0

determine that Sean has no interest because allowing such would subvert the purpose 0f having a
statute

4.

of limitations.

Allowing a Court t0 use the Partition Statute t0 Quiet Title also Wreaks Havoc 0n
the Burdens 0f Proof which each Party must Bear
In addition to nullifying the application of the statute 0f limitations, allowing a party to

bootstrap a partition action into a quiet

0f proof. In Idaho,

it

that the holder

0f this presumption

0f which the legal

by evidence that
Russ Ballard

& F.A.I.

v.

title

is

is that:

0f title t0 property is the owner thereof. The
[One] who would claim ownership 0f property

must
and convincing.”

stands 0f record in another

clear, satisfactory

.

.

.

Lava Hot Springs Resort, Ina, 548 P.2d

omitted) (emphasis added); see also

On the

action creates havoc with Idaho’s required burdens

has been very longstanding that

The law presumes
effect

title

Erb

v.

establish such claim

72, 79 (1976) (citations

Kohnke, 824 P.2d 903, 906—07

(Id. Ct.

App. 1992).

other hand, cotenancy laws setup a series 0f rebuttable presumptions. 20

Am.

2d Cotenancy and Joint Ownership §I I 6, Presumptions and inferences— Equality 0f interest
cotenancy. Unless the deed states otherwise, there
equal. Id. That presumption

purchase price.

proof of a
Nat.

gift

Id.

may be

rebutted

Lastly, that presumption

is

Jur.

in

a presumption that the parties’ shares are

by evidence of unequal contributions

may be rebutted by

evidence of a

gift.

to the

Id.

In Idaho,

must be made by “clear and convincing evidence.” Idaho First Nat. Bank v. First

Bank ofCaldwell, 340 P2.d

Appellant’s Reply Brief— Pg. 10

1094, 1100 (Idaho 1959).

By allowing

a party t0 use the partition statute t0 quiet

title,

that party is supplanting their

requirement t0 show by clear and convincing evidence that they are entitled t0 ownership With
the series of presumptions that

is

was claiming ownership of property 0f which

So, in this case, Lindsey

Sean’s

and

name (Lindsey persistently

that she

owned 100% of the

and convincing evidence
because

this

title

As

was

the

been required

owner even though Sean was 0n

into a partition action, all

t0

title.

prove by clear

However,

Lindsey had t0 show was that she paid

a result 0f the district court allowing Lindsey t0 use a partition action t0

against Sean, the burden of proof was placed

Lindsey gifted him a

legal title stood in

alleged and averred that she never gave any interest t0 Sean

property). Lindsey should have

that she

was bootstrapped

for the property.

quiet

called for under general cotenancy laws.

50%

interest in the property. R.

upon Sean

357

(the

t0 “clearly establish” that

Memo.

Dec. and Order 0n Court

Trial, p. 7).

Importantly, the district court found, “The evidence at
the party 0f Plaintiff was conﬂicting.” R. 358.

The

district court

[Sean] did not establish that Plaintiff [Lindsey] gave

in favor

reversing the burdens 0f proof when
Importantly, in the past,

actions

to

it

1 1

interest in the property.”

should have), the

it

district court

allowed the partition statutes t0 be used to quiet

have gifted an

the recipient 0f the gift of the real property to prove

Appellant’s Reply Brief— Pg.

concluded “that Defendant

of Sean. Consequently, the district court erred by

When Idaho has looked

where a party was alleged

concerning donative intent 0n

him an ownership

R. 358. If the burden of proof had fallen upon Lindsey (as

would have undoubtedly found

trial

at the

burden 0f proof for quiet

interest in real property, instead

by

clear

title.

title

of requiring

and convincing evidence

that the

gift occurred, the

seeking t0 quiet

Idaho Court of Appeals continued to place the burden of proof upon the party

title.

Erb

v.

Kohnke, 824 P.2d 903

(Id. Ct.

App. 1992).

In Erb, a case very factually similar to the present case, Mr. Erb signed a purchase

agreement to buy property.
checking account.
the

905-06. Mr. Erb paid for the purchase entirely from his

Id. at

Id. at 906.

name of Ms. Konhke, Mr.

At

closing,

Mr. Erb directed

that the property

be placed entirely in

Erb’s then live-in girlfriend. Id. After Mr. Erb passed away, his

personal representative sought t0 set aside the gift 0f the property t0 Ms. Kohnke. Id. In
evaluating that matter, the Idaho Court 0f Appeals stated, “the estate has the burden at

establishing

by

Kohnke] was
proving

‘clear, satisfactory

invalid.” Id.

The

and convincing’ evidence that the conveyance

trial

0f

t0 [Ms.

appellate court did not use the burden 0f proof associated with

gifts.

Similarly, if the district court

party t0 bear the burden t0 prove

entitled t0 the property interest

by

is

going to quiet

title

clear, satisfactory

which Sean holds by

against Sean, Lindsey should be the

and convincing evidence

Virtue 0f him being

In a nut shell, allowing a party t0 essentially quiet

title

on

that she is

legal

title.

against a cotenant in a partition

matter results in gross, arbitrary inconsistencies in the law. For example,

1)

If a party gives

satisfactory

to another, the granting party

and convincing evidence

824 P.2d 903

3

100% 0f legal title

(1d. Ct.
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was

invalid.3

Cf Erb

v.

clear,

Kohnke,

App. 1992).

In order for a party t0 divest another of legal

convincing evidence.

that the gift

must show by

title,

they must prove their case by clear and

2)

Alternatively, if a party only gives an unstated partial interest of legal

the receiving party

The only
interest

factual difference

away while

by

clear

clearly establish that a gift

between these two scenarios

different.

title

to

show

Drawing such an

clear

(a high burden);

was made.4

Cf.

R. 356-60.

was granted away. Yet

and

is

upon

the burdens 0f

the party petitioning to get

in the other, the

and convincing evidence of the

t0 another,

one a party gave 100% of their

that in

In one scenario the burden

and convincing evidence

party holding

is

in the other only half 0f their interest

proof could not be more
title

must

title

burden

is

upon

the

gift.

arbitrary distinction over such important

and vastly different burdens 0f

proof does not make sense and does not meet any notion of fairness 0r justice. Idaho should and

must

select a

uniform burden 0f proof for the remedy 0f quieting

title

against a party.

The

burden of proof for an identical remedy should not change merely because one parties ﬁles under
the auspices 0f a partition action instead of a quiet

title

action.

A more reasonable and consistent approach in a partition action would require a district
court t0 review only evidence as to

how much

interest a party has, not

evidence as t0 Whether or

not a party has any interest. In Sean’s motion in limine, he sought exactly

that:

a prohibition

against Lindsey from submitting any evidence indicating that Sean did not have any interest.

However, the

district court

evidence to quiet

4

title

improperly denied that motion and then relied upon that very

against Sean.

This standard was set forth by the
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district court in this matter.

Lastly,

it

should be noted that the

granted

district court

summary judgment

against

Lindsey’s resulting trust theory. R. 65-67 (Memo. Dec. and Order 0n Df.’s Mot. For

Summary

Judgment). The claim for a resulting trust was found to be barred by the statute of limitations.

For Sean to have been on legal
title),

would place him

trustee for a cestui

being 0n legal

que

title,

title,

but Without owning any interest

in the position

trust

not holding equitable

of trustee. However, any claim based 0n Sean being a

was barred by

was found not

(i.e.

t0 hold

the statute of limitations. Yet, in this matter, Sean,

any equitable

In conclusion, the district court erred

When

title

Via a partition action.

used the partition

it

statute t0 quiet title

against Sean. Consequently, this Court should reverse the judgment of the district court.

Lindsey Should not have been Allowed t0 Admit Evidence that she did not Intend to
Gift Sean
Interest in the Real Property

5.

m

Idaho law has long been clear that extrinsic evidence

When

a deed

is

unambiguous. See Hall

v.

is

not allowed t0 determine intent

Hall, 777 P.2d 255, 256 (Idaho 1989). Indeed, a party

“should not be allowed, by extrinsic evidence, t0 contradict the plain language 0f the deed.
Bliss

v.

Bliss,

the deed

898 P.2 1081, 1086 (Idaho 1995). In the situation

unambiguously grants Sean “some

much

interest

grant

some

interest,”

each party has. See Response Brief at

interest t0 Sean,

according to Idaho law, the

however,

it is

district court

and 2) the deed

p.

silent as t0

at bar,

is

ambiguous

as to

that: 1)

how

7 (“Lastly, the deed does unambiguously

how much 0f an interest.

.

.”).

Therefore,

should not have allowed in any evidence to contradict

the plain language 0f the deed with respect t0 whether or not Sean
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the parties agree

.”
.

had any

interest.

Moreover, the
Lindsey When

it

district court relied entirely

upon

the parol evidence that

was presented by

determined that Sean had not been gifted any interest in the property:

The evidence

at trial

concerning donative intent on the part of Plaintiff was

conﬂicting. Although the Warranty Deed t0 the property listing both Plaintiff and
Defendant as grantees gives rise t0 an inference that Plaintiff intended a gift t0
Defendant 0f an ownership interest in the propertys, evidence introduced at trial

tended t0 contradict

which

Both parties testiﬁed t0 one or more conversations in
Defendant for assurance that he would not “screw” her out

that.

Plaintiff asked

at the time he was planning on being with
These conversations are the strongest evidence 0f
Plaintiff” s lack of intent to gift an ownership interest in the property t0 Defendant.
Further, Plaintiff” s direct testimony was that she did not intend t0 give an
ownership interest in the property. On cross—examination, Defendant testiﬁed that
he told Plaintiff if he decided t0 leave their relationship on his own that he would
not claim a one—half interest in the home, but that he would “just walk away.”
This is inconstant with Plaintiff” s gifting an interest in the property t0 Defendant.
At trial Defendant did not present evidence of any conversations regarding a gift
at 0r around the time of closing. Thus, the Court determines that Defendant did
not establish that Plaintiff gave him an ownership interest in the property.

of the house. Defendant testiﬁed that

Plaintiff for the rest

R. 391

of his

life.

(Memo. Dec. and Order on Court

Trial).

Defendant also argues that the parties’ relationship and the fact that Defendant’s
name is 0n the Warranty Deed establishes Plaintiff’s intent t0 give Defendant an
interest under Erb v. Kohnke, 121 Idaho 328, 824 P.2d 903 (Ct. App.
The Erb case involved an unmarried couple and a dispute over ownership

ownership
1992).

0f a home when Willis Erb paid the purchase price for the home and instructed
the title company not t0 place his name 0n the deed, but t0 place Sarah Kohnke’s

name 0n the

deed.

The Erb court determined

“[t]he evidence in this case

When

was conveyed to
Sarah, Willis had the intention t0 make a gift 0f the property t0 her.” Id. At 335,
824 P.2d at 910. The Erb court explained that there was “an absence -- 0n Willis’
part -- of any intention to create a resulting trust.” Id. The Erb court concluded
indicates that, at the time 0f the transaction

Willis possessed the intent to

make

a gift of the property in the absence of any

evidence t0 the contrary. In contrast t0 Erb, there

5

This

is

an incomplete statement 0f the law.

not only gives rise t0 an inference that the
contradicted

by parol evidence.
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legal title

is

evidence that Plaintiff did not

A deed Which unambiguously names the grantee(s)

named

grantee(s) are owners, but also cannot be

make

intend t0

a gift 0f an ownership interest in the property to Defendant.

Thus, Defendant has not established Plaintiff” s intent t0
R. 393

(Memo. Dec. and Order on Court

make

.

.

a gift under Erb.

In each justiﬁcation for ﬁnding that Sean

Trial).

held no interest in the property, the district court relied entirely on testimony Which
contradicted the plain language 0f the deed. But, as the parties have already agreed, “the

deed does unambiguously grant some
the deed

interest t0

unambiguously granted some

to determine that

Sean.” Seeing

interest t0 Sean,

Lindsey did not grant any ownership

it

as the parties agree that

cannot be possible for the court

interest in the property t0 Sean.

Lindsey, however, contends that the evidence of Whether 0r not she granted Sean an
interest in the property is the

same evidence

that the district court

would and should use

determine What percentage interest Sean owned. See Response Brief at
the same.”).

However,

the parties as to

that evidence is not the

p.

6 (“The evidence

same evidence. Aside from

what was intended, the learned courts 0f other

states

is

direct statements

have looked

evidence: 1) cohabitation/relationship intimacy, 2) joint ﬁnancial acts, and 3) the

Which the

t0

by

t0 other

manner

in

parties treated other property.

ALASKA
“Other relevant factors in determining the intent 0f the parties regarding their respective
interests in

common property,

in the absence

0f an express agreement, include their

cohabitation; other ioint ﬁnancial acts, such as joint savings or checking accounts; and

manner

6

in

which theV treated other propertv held

Response Brief at

p. 7.
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th_e

individually at the beginning of their

relationship.”

D.M.

v.

D.A., 885 P.2d 94, 98 (Alaska 1994) (emphasis added). In D.M., the

Alaska Supreme Court reviewed the exact same question present

deed D.A. executed 0n December 30, 1988, conveyed her
herself and

D.M.

It

in this matter. Id.

interest in the

At 96 (“The

Palmer property

t0

does not specify the particular interest that each was t0 receive.”) (emphasis

added). In determining What interest

D.M. was conveyed,

the Alaska

Supreme Court

instructed

that,

The common law has long recognized
respective interests 0f tenants in

that presumptions concerning the

common Where one

contributes unequally t0 the

purchase price are not applicable Where the relationship between the parties

might have intended to make a gift t0 the other. Wood v.
Collins merely recognizes that where the parties cohabit and share an intimate
relationship, it is more likely than otherwise that one party may contribute more
of the acquisition or upkeep costs and still expect only an equal share 0f the
indicates that one

property.

Id.

At

fn. 7. (citations

omitted).

OREGON
We believe a division of property accumulated during a period of cohabitation
must be begun by inquiring
found,

it

into the intent

of the

parties,

should control that property distribution.

.

.

and

if

an intent can be

Thus, absent express

agreement, courts should closely examine the facts in evidence to determine what

drawn from
factual settings in Which the parties lived. Cohabitation itself can be relevant
evidence 0f an agreement t0 share incomes during continued cohabitation.

the parties implicitly agreed upon.

.

.

In such cases, inferences can be

Additionally, ioint acts 0f a ﬁnancial nature can give rise to an inference that
the parties intended to share equally.

Such

acts

might include a joint checking

account, a joint savings account, 0r joint purchases.

When Oregon looked at

Bea]

v.

that,

absent an express agreement, the relevant evidence would concur with those found by

Beal, 577 P.2d 507, 5 10 (Oregon 1978).

Alaska: cohabitation, joint ﬁnancial acts, and joint purchases.
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cohabitation,

it

found

WYOMING
Wyoming

agreed with Oregon and followed

(Wyoming 2010) (“We

suit.

Hofstad v. Christie, 240 P.3d 816 821

agree with Beal that property accumulated before separation should be

divided by determining the express or implied intent of the parties.”). In Hoﬁtad, the convincing
factors included, “as conclusive evidence

Donegal deed

the

0f Mr. Hofstad’s

intent,

he put Ms. Christie’s name 0n

after they rekindled their relationship.” Id.

Three 0f Idaho’s closest northwestern neighbors that have addressed
that the facts that determine

cohabitation, the extent to

and
be

how they treated

still

0n the

table

how much

interest a

which they comingled

this issue all agree

person owned in a property includes the parties’
their ﬁnancial lives (Le. joint ﬁnancial acts),

other property and joint purchases. A11 0f that evidence

would and should

and available for proper presentation without contradicting the plain language

0f the deed.

Of course,

all

owned the property
explains point

0f that evidence weighs heavily in favor 0f a ﬁnding that Lindsey and Sean

as 50/50 cotenants. See R.

by point each

factor)7.

But,

310 — 338 (Sean’s

more

importantly,

it is

post-trial brief wherein

he

the only kind of evidence that

& Lindsey had been in an intimate relationship for more than 10 years
home. The average length of a marriage that ends in divorce is 7 to 8
years. Moreover, for much 0f that time the two had been sharing joint expenses (cell phone,
groceries, utilities, property taxes, internet, tv, etc.). Also, While Lindsey had a separate
checking account, Sean’s only bank account was a joint bank account with Lindsey. In fact, his
paycheck was direct deposited into that joint banking account, which Lindsey had access t0 and
used jointly for his and her personal expenses. Lindsey testiﬁed that she would pay the bills
from Whichever bank account had the money. R. 355, 11 16. Also, all their other purchased items
were purchased jointly and they always referred t0 the house as “our house.” It was never
7

For brief reference, Sean

prior to purchasing the

referred t0 as “Lindsey’s house.”
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should have been allowed because that

someone

is

the evidence courts use to determine

how much

interest

and focused on the evidence presented by

has. Instead, the district court allowed in

Lindsey whereby Lindsey claimed Sean had no ownership whatsoever. However, as stated
above, the quiet

title

was already dismissed with prejudice

question 0f whether 0r not Sean

interest t0 Sean. .”
.

started. .”
.

an

interest

Sean owned. As Lindsey concedes

interest

some

owned an

interest.

Sean had

Q

As

such, at

interest.

trial

p.

7

at issue.

in her brief, “the

and “Sean did have an

Response Brief at

was not

in Sean’s favor; therefore, the

..

the question

deed does unambiguously grant

interest in this property

& 5 respectively.

was how much

when this

litigation

Lindsey agrees and concedes that Sean had

the district court should not have allowed any contrary evidence that

The only question

for trial

was how much

interest

Sean had.

Moreover, that objection was properly stated in Sean’s motion in limine, which was
argued, but denied, immediately before

trial.

In conclusion, the district court improperly denied Sean’s

motion

in limine prohibiting

Lindsey from producing evidence and claiming that she never intended to give Sean any
Therefore, this Court should reverse the judgment 0f the district court and

remand

it

interest.

t0

reconsider the matter excluding any evidence that Lindsey did not intend t0 grant any interest at

all,

Which evidence contradicts the plain language of the deed.
6.

District Court Erred when it Disregarded the Fact that Lindsey Intentionally
Placed Sean 0n the Deed Knowing that it would Result in him Owning a 50%

The

Interest in the Property

Next, Lindsey claims that there
that

is

ample “evidence

Lindsey did not intend t0 give Sean an

Appellant’s Reply Brief— Pg. 19

interest in the

t0 support the Trial Court’s

home when

she placed

ﬁnding

him on the

deed.” Response Brief, p.

Lindsey did not intend t0
“if substantial

ﬁnding

gift

Sean an

interest in the

though conﬂicting evidence exists

that, since the district court

home,

that

and second, there

is

no

found

that

ﬁnding should not be disturbed

t0 support it.”

Response

Brief, p. 8. First, the

never actually made a factual ﬁnding that Lindsey did not intend to

district court

to Sean;

Moreover, Lindsey claims

8.

gift

any

substantial evidence that Lindsey did n_ot intend a gift

interest

and any

to the contrary is clearly erroneous.

A. The District Court did not Make any Factual Finding that Lindsey did not [mend a
Gift

T0

begin,

it

should be noted that the

paragraphs, 0f its decision t0

its

district court

devoted three pages, eighteen

“Findings 0f Fact.” R. 386

—

mention in the court’s “Findings 0f Fact” regarding Lindsey’s
discussed at

all in

388. There

intent.

is

not one single

Instead, intent

the court’s opinion until the “Conclusions 0f Law” section.

in the district court’s conclusions

0f law,

it

only concludes

More

is

importantly,

that,

“Thus, the Court determines that Defendant did not establish that Plaintiff gave

him an ownership

interest in the property;”8

and

“Thus, Defendant has not established Plaintiff’s intent t0 give an ownership
interest under Ashe;”9 and
“Thus, Defendant has not established
Erb.”10

8

9

R. 391.
R. 392.

10

R. 393.
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Plaintiff” s intent t0

make

a gift under

not

The

district court

never makes a factual ﬁnding that Lindsey did not intend to make a

Instead, the court only concludes that

make

a

gift.

Sean (Defendant) did not establish that Lindsey intended

Saying “you have not presented enough evidence t0 establish your claim”

different

from making a factual ﬁnding based on the evidence. One

other (as

is

the case in this matter)

Since this Court
matter

is

is

is

one 0f “free review.

.

.

determine whether the

t0

As

trial

court correctly stated the

trial

the facts found.” Cf. Baxter

v.

court and determine Whether or not

intent.

Thus, contrary t0 Lindsey’s suggestion, this Court
if there is substantial

B.

that Lindsey did not Intend t0

if it is

Sean, the ﬁnding

set aside

is

not relegated t0 simply determining

supporting evidence or that the ﬁndings of facts are clearly erroneous.

Any Finding

Next, even

determined that there

would be

0n appeal unless they are

P.3d 304, 3 10 (Idaho 2002).

The

by

court reached the right conclusion of law that Sean failed t0 produce sufﬁcient evidence

of Lindsey’s

11

district court, this

applied t0 the case at hand, this Court has free

review t0 consider the “Findings 0f Fact” reached by the

gift to

vastly

a factual ﬁnding and the

reviewing the legal conclusion“ reached by the

Craney, 16 P.3d 263, 269 (Idaho 2000).

trial

is

is

t0

a legal conclusion.

applicable law, and Whether the legal conclusions are sustained

the

gift.

It

legal conclusion being

present enough evidence to
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is

“A trial

clearly erroneous.”

should also be noted

is

t0

Sean

is

Clearly Erroneous

a factual ﬁnding that Lindsey did not intend a

clearly erroneous.

reviewed

make a gift

Camp

court’s ﬁndings 0f fact will not be

v.

East Fork Ditch C0., Ltd, 55

that, “the intent

0f the donor controls

the district court’s determination that Sean did not

show Lindsey intended

t0 give

him an

interest in the property.

Whether 0r not there was a
2009) (emphasis added).

Looking

at

gift.

It is

.”
.

BLI v. Dixson

Irrevocable Trust, 206 P.3d 481, 491 (Idaho

Lindsey ’s intent that matters, not Sean’s.

Lindsey’s intent,

it

would be erroneous

t0

ﬁnd

that

Lindsey intended anything

other than to give Sean an interest in the house. Lindsey absolutely intended t0 gift Sean an

interest in the property.

it

would

When Lindsey put

him having an

result in

Sean’s

name 0n

interest in the property.

the deed, her understanding

One Who engages

in conduct

that particular results are substantially certain t0 follow also intends the results.

(Second) 0f Torts

§8A and comment b

Owen, Prosser and Keaton 0n Torts

(1965); see also

§8, at

35 (5th

ed.

W.

was

that

knowing

Restatement

Keeton, D. Dobbs, R. Keaton,

& D.

1984) (“[Intent] extends not only t0 those

consequences Which are desired, but also t0 those Which the actor believes are substantially
certain t0 follow

1.

from what the actor does”).

Prior to Lindsey placing Sean’s

d0

it

because

it

would

result in

court’s Finding of Fact

2.

It

the deed, Lindsey’s parents told her not t0

Sean having an

interest in the

home. R. 387

(the trial

9).

Despite knowing the consequences, at closing, Lindsey went forward with placing
Sean’s

12

No.

name 0n

name 0n

title.

R. 387 (the

trial

should be noted that Lindsey admitted that

court’s Finding of Fact

When

she insisted t0 have her

not “trying t0 deprive Sean 0f his interest.” Tr. 110: 1 8- 111:2.
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N0. 10)

.12

name

ﬁrst,

she was

Two years

3.

later,

Lindsey acknowledged

house. R. 388 (the

Based

solely

trial

in

writing that Sean had an interest in the

court’s Finding 0f Fact n0. 17).

on the above refenced three

facts

13

Which were found by the

court,

it

would be

erroneous to reach any conclusion other than Lindsey intended t0 give Sean an interest in the

home. Regardless, most 0f the other

Each ﬁnding of fact

1.

The

parties

facts that

as set forth

by

were found by the court support Sean’s

position.

the district court Will be brieﬂy discussed in order:

Finding 0f Fact
began a romantic relationship

Bearing 0n Intent
This fact does not bear 0n Lindsey’s intent.

in 2002. R. 353.

2.

t0 2007, Sean & Lindsey lived
Sean paid rent, Lindsey paid for
groceries, and they split the cost 0f

From 2003

This fact supports a ﬁnding that Lindsey

together.

intended t0 gift Sean an interest.”

utilities.

3.

R. 353.

In 2009, Sean

& Lindsey moved back in

intended t0

together. R. 353.

4.

In 2012/2013, Lindsey inherited

money

which she used t0 purchase the home at
issue. Both Sean and Lindsey participated
in making decisions about construction
and design features of the home. R. 353.

13

Cohabitation supports a ﬁnding that Lindsey

The

gift

fact that

Sean an interest.”

Sean

& Lindsey both

making decisions regarding the
construction and design of the home weakly
supports a ﬁnding that Lindsey intended to

participated in

gift

Sean an

interest.

In Lindsey’s deposition, she testiﬁed that Sean’s “claim t0 the house” referred t0 his

ownership

interest in the house.

Aug. EX. R. 452 (Depo. of Lindsey,

p. 73: 1-12);

see also Tr.

103: 14-17.
14

See D.M.

v.

1978); Hofstad

D.A., 885 P.2d 94, 98 (Alaska 1994); Bea]
v.

Christie,

v.

Beal, 577 P.2d 507, 510 (Oregon

240 P.3d 816 821 (Wyoming 2010). These cases discuss

that

cohabitating, joint ﬁnancial acts, and treating other property as jointly held are relevant in

determining that there
15

is

an intent t0 share property

1d.
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interests.

5.

6.

Defendant did not pay for any part 0f the
purchase price. R. 353.

This fact does not bear 0n Lindsey’s intent.

Plaintiff paid $303,794.22 for the

This fact does not bear 0n Lindsey’s intent.

property. R. 353.

7.

Lindsey asked Sean for assurances that he
would not “screw her out 0f her house” if
she placed his

name on the

deed. R. 354.

This fact supports a ﬁnding that Lindsey
intended to gift Sean an interest.

him
8.

g0 forward With building
the home unless his name was on the
Sean refused

t0

How could

Sean have “screwed” Lindsey out 0f her
house if she understood that she was n_0t
giving him an interest in the home? Lindsey
knew she was giving Sean an interest in her
home, and she did not want t0 be screwed by
for that decision.

This fact does not bear 0n Lindsey’s intent.

deed. R. 354.

9.

Lindsey’s parents warned her that if she
put Sean’s name 0n the deed, he would

that

have an ownership

an

interest in the property.

This fact overwhelmingly supports a ﬁnding

Lindsey absolutely intended t0

Sean’s

R. 354.

was

name 0n

that

it

gift

Sean

When Lindsey put

interest in the property.

the deed, her understanding

would

result in

him having an

interest in this property.”

10.

At

closing, Lindsey

that her

11.

name was

changed the deed so

This fact does not bear 0n Lindsey’s intent.

listed ﬁrst. R. 354.

Lindsey and Sean were

listed as grantees

0n the deed. R. 354.

This fact supports a ﬁnding that Lindsey
intended t0 give Sean an interest as Sean’s

name was

listed

thereon with Lindsey’s

permission and Lindsey
allowing his

own
16

One Who engages

in conduct

knowing

to

be on

that

title

by

Sean would

an interest in the home.

that particular results are substantially certain t0 follow

also intends the results. Restatement (Second) of Torts

Keeton, D. Dobbs, R. Keaton,

name

knew

§8A and comment b

(1965); see also

& D. Owen, Prosser and Keeton on Torts §8, at 35

W.

(5th ed. 1984)

only t0 those consequences which are desired, but also t0 those which the
actor believes are substantially certain t0 follow from what the actor does”).
(“[Intent] extends not
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12.

13.

Sean selected $50,000 of upgrades to the

This fact mildly shows Lindsey intended to

property. R. 355.

gift

Sean

Sean an interest. Even before living there
Sean and Lindsey treated the house as though
it were partly Sean’s (by allowing him to
customize it With $50,000 0f upgrades).

& Lindsey each paid

1/2

of the real

estate taxes. R. 355.

This supports a ﬁnding that Lindsey intended
to share the

home with Sean

interest) as they shared

all

(and

gift

him an

0f the home’s

maintenance/holding costs.

14.

The property was not encumbered by a

This fact does not bear 0n Lindsey’s intent.

mortgage.

15.

The

0n the property

parties lived together

from October 2013

until

November 2017.

Cohabitation evidences Lindsey’s intent t0
gift

Sean an

interest in the

home.

R. 355.

16.

The

comingled their ﬁnancial
accounts and shared the payment of

Joint ﬁnancial acts (such as joint checking

parties

and savings accounts) evidences Lindsey’s
intent t0 gift Sean an interest in the home.

expenses. R. 355.

17.

Lindsey signed an agreement
acknowledging Sean’s “claim t0 the house
at

3013 N. Cormac Loop.

.”
.

R. 355.

This fact strongly evidences that Lindsey
intended that Sean be gifted an interest in the
property.

Two years

after construction

home, Lindsey acknowledged

that

0f the

Sean had a

claim to the house.

18.

Sean and Lindsey broke up

in the fall

0f

This fact does not bear 0n Lindsey’s intent.

2017. R. 355.

As can be

seen, after going through each 0f the ﬁndings of facts that

court,

plainly erroneous to reach any conclusion other than Lindsey intended to give Sean an

it is

were made by the

district

interest.

As pointed

BLI v. Dixson

out above, “the intent 0f the donor controls whether 0r not there

Irrevocable Trust, 206 P.3d 481, 491 (Idaho 2009) (emphasis added).
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was a
It is

gift.

.’
.

9

Lindsey ’s intent that matters, not Sean’s. Lindsey wades through paragraphs 0f testimony by
Sean,
the

all

0f Which focuses 0n Whether 0r not Sean believed he was being gifted a

home. Lindsey poses

that all

50%

interest in

0f this evidence 0f Sean’s intent “provided the best evidence

support the Trial Court’s ﬁnding that Lindsey did not intend t0 give Sean an interest in the

when

she placed

matters as he

is

him 0n

the deed.”

Response

Brief, p. 8.

t0

home

However, none 0f that evidence

not the donor.

For example, Lindsey claims that the “cheating contract”
Lindsey intended t0 give Sean an

interest in the

Lindsey would not kick him out 0f the home.
about that document

irrelevant.

is

not competent evidence that

home” because “Sean was just making

.”

is

What Lindsey thought about

signed a document that stated, “[Sean’s] claim t0 the house at 3013 N.
threatened in any way.

.”
.

sure

But what Sean was doing, 0r what he thought

.

What matters

“is

it.

Lindsey

Cormac Loop

shall not

be

R. 388. Lindsey testiﬁed that her understanding 0f the term Sean’s

“claim t0 the house” means that Sean “ha[s] an investment in the house.

.

.

ownership

interest,

yeah.” See Aug. EX. R. 452 (Depo. of Lindsey, p. 73: 1-12); see also Tr. 103:14-17.
Resultantly,

it

does not matter

how Lindsey

contract.” Instead, the important

that

takeaway

Sean had “an investment in the house.

characterizes Sean’s understanding 0f the “cheating

is

.

.

that

Lindsey understood

ownership

interest,

it

as an

yeah.” 1d.

Lastly, Lindsey describes the trial court’s decision as also including a

“Lindsey did not understand

There

is

how

deeds work.

.”
.

Response

acknowledgement

ﬁnding

that

Brief, p. 13. Again, this is not true.

no such corresponding ﬁnding of fact. In the Conclusions 0f Law section 0f the

opinion, the district court wrote that “Despite Plaintiff’s parents’ warning, her
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trial

testimony

showed

that she did not understand that placing Defendant’s

Defendant’s owning an interest in the property.

ﬁnding of fact,

that is clearly erroneous.

Your parents

Q.

They

told

you not

At

.”
.

trial,

t0 put

R. 392.

name 0n

To

the deed could result in

the extent that

is

construed as a

Lindsey testiﬁed,

Sean 0n the deed, didn’t they?

did.

Because they were concerned

that

Sean would have an

interest in the

home?

Yes.

And they told you this before you

signed these buyer instructions, didn’t they?

p?.OPDPQP

Yes.

And

s0 did

you think your parents were lying

to

you?

N0.

You didn’t believe them?

P
Tr. 41 14
:

No,

I

did [believe them].

— 42:3. While no one would accuse Lindsey of being

a real estate tycoon, in her

testimony she stated that prior to signing the instructions placing Sean on
her that if she did so he would

At

own

her parents told

an interest in the home. Moreover, Lindsey believed them.

the time she executed the instructions placing Sean

be for Sean t0 have an

title,

own

interest in the

home.

It

on

title,

she believed that the result would

simply does not matter that Lindsey lacked

experience With real estate. Her belief at the time was that by putting Sean on the deed, he

would have an

interest in the house.
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With

that belief, she put

Sean on the deed. As such, she

intended the consequence that she believed would happen: Sean would

Any ﬁnding
To

otherwise

is

clearly erroneous.

the extent that Lindsey claims that

expressing an attempt to

own half 0f the home.

by putting her name

own 100% of the property,

in her

ﬁrst

on the deed she was

own testimony

she denies that as the

purpose for her request.
Q.

The only claim
House?

A.

Yes.

.0

Okay. During the construction 0f the house, you told your parents
that Sean was going t0 be 0n the deed, didn’t you?

that you’re

aware 0f that Sean would have

is

a claim t0 half 0f the

at

some point

Yes.

And they were upset

about that?

Yes.
@PQPDP

Because they didn’t want Sean 0n the deed, did they?

N0, they

didn’t.

Because they were afraid

if

Sean was on the deed, he would claim an ownership

interest in the house, right?

P>

That’s what.

..

Yes.

Did your parents ever tell you that if you name was
would not have an interest in the house?
No.

Did anyone
N0.
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else ever tell

you

that?

ﬁrst

on the deed

that

Sean

—

Tr. 126:5

127:2. Elsewhere during the

By putting your name

Okay.

Q.

interest in the house,

Iwas paying

A.

trial,

Lindsey

ﬁrst,

said,

you weren’t

trying t0 deprive Sean 0f his

were you?

for the house, s0

Iwanted—

A simple yes or no is ﬁne. You were paying for the house, so you wanted to be
ﬁrst?

Yes.

Q.

But you weren’t trying

A.

N0.

Tr. 110:

1

8

—

111:2. There

other than as follows:

is

t0 deprive

Sean 0f his

n0 evidence by Lindsey where she expresses any understanding

by putting Sean on

the deed he

would have an ownership

house. There’s n0 testimony that by putting Lindsey’s
that

Sean would not receive an

interest in the house.

testiﬁed that she believed her parents

property. Lindsey also testiﬁed that

0f any

interest.

Sean 0n the
It

is

title

As

that

name

ﬁrst

would

result in

In fact, there’s contrary testimony. Lindsey

When they told her

by putting her name

him owning an

does not matter that Lindsey
at the

by placing Sean on

t0 receive half of the

is

she would have an interest in the
ﬁrst, she

was not

trying to deprive Sean

29

know that placing

interest in the property is clearly erroneous.

not familiar with real estate transactions.

What matters

time she had Sean placed on the deed. Her belief at that time

the deed he

would own half 0f the home. Lindsey intended

house when she knowingly placed him 0n the deed.
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0n the deed Lindsey thought

such, any conclusion or ﬁnding of fact that Lindsey did not

what Lindsey intended

was

interest?

for

Sean

Consequently, the judgment 0f the

remand

this

district court

should be reversed and this Court should

matter With instructions t0 enter a judgment stating that Sean owns a

50%

interest in

the property.

CONCLUSION
Because the

district court

impermissibly used the partition statutes to quiet

title

against

Sean, and errantly allowed and ﬁxated 0n evidence Which contradicted the plain and

unambiguous deed, and erred by disregarding the

fact that

Lindsey intentionally placed Sean on

the deed, this Court should reverse the judgment of the district court and
instructions to enter judgment in favor 0f Sean, declaring that he has a

remand

50%

this

matter with

interest in the

home.
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